Sustainability and Beyond by Jamieson, Dale & University of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Books, Reports, and Studies Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment 
1996 
Sustainability and Beyond 
Dale Jamieson 
University of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/books_reports_studies 
 Part of the Sustainability Commons 
Citation Information 





DALE JAMIESON, SUSTAINABILITY AND BEYOND (Natural Res. 
Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law 1996). 
 
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson 
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the 
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law 
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School. 
 
--NatUral· Resources Law·Center 
University of Colorado School of Law . 
. · 
SUSTAJNABILITY AND BEYOND 
Dale Jamieson 
Professor of Philosophy 
University of Colorado 
Boulder, Colorado 
... 
Public ~d Policy Discits_sion Pap~rs S~ries 
SUST AINABILITY AND BEYOND 
Dale Jamieson 
Professor of Philosophy 
University of Colorado 
Boulder, Colorado 
NRLC Public Land Policy 
Discussion Paper Series 
(PL02) 
Natural Resources Law Center 
1996 
This publication is a product of the Natural Resources Law Center, a 
research and public education program at the University of Colorado School 
of Law. The Center' s primary goal is to promote a sustainable society 
through improved public understanding of environmental and natural 
resources issues. 
Interpretations, recommendations, or conclusions in this Natural 
Resources Law Center publication are solely those of the authors and should 
not be attributed to the Center, the University of Colorado,· the State of 
Colorado, or any of the organizations that support Natural Resources Law 
Center research. · 
SUST AINABILITY AND BEYOND 
Dale Jamieson 1 
Introduction 
During the decade of the 1980s the phrase "sustainable development" migrated from 
an obscure report produced by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources in 1980, through several popular "green" books, to become the central 
organizing concept of the Brundtland Commission report. Convened by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and known officially as the World Conunission on 
Environment and Development, the Brundtland Commission identified sustainable 
development as the criterion against which human changes of the environment should be 
measured, and defined it as development that "meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."2 By joining the 
words "sustainable" and "development," the Commission sought to reconcile the demands of 
the environment with concerns about global poverty. Shridath Rampbal, who served on the 
Brundtland Commission, has recently written that 
[t]he great achievement of the sustainable development concept 
is that it broke With the old conservationist approach to natural 
resources and its tendency to place Earth's other species above 
people.3 
While those who were most concerned with poverty could emphasize the word "development" 
in the Brundtland formulation, environmentalists could just as well emphasize the word 
"sustainable." 
1Dale Jamieson is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder, and also serves as an 
Adjunct Scientist in the Environmental and Societal Impacts Group at the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research in Boulder. 
1The World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 43. 
3Ramphal, Shridath, Our Country, the Planet: Forging a Partnership for Survival (Washington, D.C.: Island 
Press, 1992), p. 143. 
The balance between fruitful ambiguity and outright contradiction is a delicate one, 
and ultimately the idea of sustainable development could not bear the weight of competing 
interpretations.4 Over the last decade ''sustainable develop~ent" has given way to the idea of 
sustainability. While on the surface this may appear to be a victory for environmentalists, it 
reflects a number of distinct concerns, including the colonization of the sustainable 
development discourse by economists, th~ lack of interest in development in the already-
developed countries, and the growing awareness that sustainable development should be 
directed towards building societal capabilities rather than towards development as an end in 
itself. But while sustainability is almost universally considered to be a good thing (there are 
few who would defend unsustainability), the tensions implicated in "sustainable development" 
are increasingly recapitulated in the various conceptions of sustainability. These ambiguities 
go back to the earliest English uses of 'sustain' and its cognates. One family of meanings is 
related to the idea of sustenance and a concern with needs is a natural extension of this 
notion. A second family of meanings centers on maintaining something in existence, and 
leads naturally to a focus on preservation. The former pushes in the direction of "meet[ing] 
the needs of the present" while the latter leans towards concern for the interests of the future . 
In this paper I discuss both the limitations and possible uses of the sustainability 
discourse. I begin by canvassing various conceptions of sustainability and sketching some 
difficulties with the notions that have been introduced. Next some possible uses of the idea of 
sustainability are identified. I go on to discuss these in the context of disputes over the public 
lands. Finally I say why we must go beyond sustainability if we are to successfully address 
the present disorder regarding the human relationship to nature. 
The Meaning and Importance of Sustainability 
Many questions can be asked .about sustainability. Two of the most important are: 
What exactly is sustainability? How important is it to achieve sustainability? While the 
answers to these questions ovetlap, I shall discuss them in tum. 
' , 
•There is an enonnous literature on this topic. One of the most provocative and influential books is Redclift, 
Michael, Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions (London: Methuen, 1987). 
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What is Sustainability? 
Most people's thoughts about the meaning of sustainability are probably simple and 
grand: Sustainability is about human survivability and the avoidance of ecological disaster. 
The professional discourse, on the other hand, is complex and technical. What both 
discourses share is an anthropocentric outlook. It is human survivability and well-being that 
ultimately matter; nature enters the picture only as a means.5 
There are many different versions of sustainability in the literature, but most agree that 
sustaining something implies that its levels do not decline over time. What distinguishes 
Strong Sustainability (SS) from Weak Sustainability (WS) are different views about what 
should be sustained. SS asserts that it is "natural capital" that should be sustained while WS 
is centered on well-being.6 WS, which is more likely to be embraced by conventional 
economists than SS, can be characterized as a state in which ''well-being does not decline 
through time."7 WS is not a very attractive conception of sustainability for a number of 
reasons. 
First, WS makes no essential reference to environmental goods. Clear-cutting forests 
and driving species to extinction would pass the WS test, so long as human well-being does 
not decline as a result. In principle, human well-being would not decline so long as other 
goods that are substitutable for forests and species could by purchased wi~ the money that 
these policies would produce. 
Second, there is little reason to object to declines in well-being so long as they are on 
the optimal path (however optimality is defined). Most of us would prefer a path that 
sExceptions to this are ~biocentrists," and those who take the interests of animals seriously. For the former 
view see, for example, Taylor, Paul, Respect for Nature: A Theorv of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986); for the latter, see Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation. second edition (New York: 
Random House, 1990). · 
. 6For discussion of WS and SS see the exchange between Wilfred Beckerman and his critics in Environmental 
Values 3 (1994), pp. 191-209; and Environmental Values 4 (1995), pp. 49-70, 169-179. For finer distinctions 
between types of weak sustainability and strong sustainability, see Turner, R. K., P. Doktor, and N. Adger, "Se~­
Level Rise and Coastal Wetlands in the U.K.: Mitigation Strategies for Sustainable Management," in Jansson, 
A., M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza, Investing in Natural Capital (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 
1995), pp. 266-290. 
7Pearce, David, Economic Values and the Natural World (London: Earthscan, 1993), p. 48. 
3 
involved greater well-being to a path that involved lesser well-being, even if the former path 
included a period of decline while the latter path did not. This is an abstract version of the 
common sense belief that sometimes we would choose to accept a setoack (e.g. an operation) 
in order to produce a result that is better overall (becoming cancer-free) than the alternatives. 
Finally, some would object to characterizing sustainability in terms of welfare rather 
than resources.' A generation has a great-:deal of control over the resources that it bequeaths 
to its succe'ssors, but little control over their welfare. Moreover, it is at least possible that 
future generations would have the highest welfare levels if we were to exploit nature to the 
greatest possible extent and invest the economic benefits in ever more convincing virtual 
reality machines. Whatever may be said on behalf of such a proposal, it would not satisfy 
any reasonable understanding of sustainability. 
SS is more in the spirit of environmentalism than WS, but it too faces difficulties. 
First, since SS is defmed in terms of the maintenance of the stock of natural capital, natural 
capital must be defined and distinguished from human-produced capital. Berkes and Folke 
characterize natural capital in the following way: 
Natural capital consists of three major components: (1) non· 
renewable resources, such as oil and minerals, that are extracted 
from ~cosystems; (2) renewable resources, such as fish, wood, 
and drinking water that are produced and maintained by the 
processes and functions of ecosystems; and (3) environmental 
services such as maintenance of the quality of the atmosphere, 
climate, operation of the hydrological cycle including flood 
controls and drinking water supply, waste assimilation, recycling 
of nutrients, generation of soils, pollination of crops, provision of 
food from the sea, and the maintenance of a vast genetic 
library.9 
'Cf. Hennan Daly who writes " ... the welfare of future generations is beyond our control and fundamentally 
none of our business ... [o]ur obligation therefore is not to guarantee their welfare but their capacity to produce, 
in the form of a minimum level of natural capital...." "On Wilfred Beckerman's Critique of Sustainable 
Development," Environmental Values 4 (1995), p. 50. 
9Berhes, F. and C. Folk, "Investing in Cultural Capit.al for Sustainable Use of Natural Capital," in Jansson, 
A., et. a!. , supra note 6, at p. 129. 
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What is most striking about this characterization is the degree to which human interests and 
activity are imp~icated in the examples of natural capital that are provided. Non-renewable 
resources are only natural capital if they are "extracted from ecosystems." Renewable 
resources such as "wood," "drinking water," and the "quality of the atmosphere" are not given 
to us by brute nature. Nature produces trees; humans act on trees in such a way so as to be 
able to use their wood. What makes water drinking water is that it is fit for humans to drink. 
Similarly, atmospheric changes are only deteriorations in the quality of the atmosphere 
relative to human uses of the atmosphere. The fundamental problem with the idea of natural 
capital is that the very idea of capital implicitly involves the idea of human transformation 
and ~se; thus it is quite difficult to distinguish natural from human produced capital. 
Second, some account must be given of what exactly it means to maintain natural 
capital. Read in ~he strongest way, any reduction in the stock of Earth's natural resources 
would violate SS. Read in the weakest way, natural capital would be maintained so long as 
there were no reduction in the kinds of things that exist, even if the stocks of each kind were 
radically reduced. Daly reads this requirement as permitting reductions in stock so long as 
the benefits produced by such reductions are invested in 
... a real rather than a merely financial substitute - e.g., a capital 
set-aside from petroleum depletion should be invested in new 
energy supplies, including improvements in energy efficiency, 
but not in, say, law schools, medical research, or McDonald's 
Hamburger franchises .10 
An analogy may help to clarify the point. If I sell part of my stamp collection and 
use the proceeds to buy more stamps, then it seems plausible to say that my stamp collection 
is maintained through these transactions. If, on the other hand, I sell part of my stamp 
collection and use the money to go on a tour of Michelin-starred restaurants, then my stamp 
. collection has not been maintained. Daly's point is that using the benefits of petroleum 
depletion to invest in new energy supplies is a way of maintaining our energy endowment, 
while investing in law schools is not. The reason for this is that natural and human-produced 
10Daly, supra note 8, at p. 51. 
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capital are complements, not substitutes; therefore human-produced capital of the sort that· 
investing in law schools would provide cannot be a substitute for the loss of natural capital 
entailed by petroletim depletion. 
Daly gives three arguments for the complementarity of natural and human-produced 
capital. The first argument rests on pointing out that human-produced capital presupposes 
natural capital, but natural capital does not=presuppose human-produced capital. But even if 
this claim is true, it establishes very little, for it is consistent with supposing that vast amounts 
of human-produced capital require only tiny amounts of natural capitaL We could accept the 
presupposition, and still hold that substitutability is generally the rule. 
The second argument rests on viewing human-produced capital as the agent for the 
transformation of natural capital into products. ]t is difficult to understand fully this claim 
since it is misleading to ascribe agency to capital. However, the basic idea appears to be that 
production requires both natural and human-produced capital. Except in the most trivial sense 
this claim seems false for intellectual property, services, and some other commodities. 
However even if this argument establishes complementarity over some domain, it is not clear 
how important this result is without some further account of how invariant are the ratios of 
natural to human-produced capital. A high degree of variance would indicate a large range of 
substitutability. 
Finally, Daly argues that if human-produced and natural capital were substitutable, 
then people would not have bothered to accumulate human-produced capital. Since they have 
bothered to accumulate human-produced capital, substitutability must fail. The fundamental 
error here is in assuming that natural capiital and human-produced capital must either be 
substitutable or complementary, but cannot be both. As Beckerman points out, commodities 
may be complements in some respects and substitutes in others. For example, we may regard 
wood and plastic as complementary - preferring to use wood for some purposes and plastic 
for others - yet treat them as substitutes in our market behavior.11 
To the extent that the distinction can be made at all, the plain fact is that we often 
treat natural and human-made capital as substitutes. In recent years we have substituted 
11Beckerman, supra note 6, Environmental Values 4 (1955), at pp. J7S-177. 
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synthetic materials for natural ones across a wide range of uses. Indeed, in Daly's own 
example it is plausible to suppose that investing in law schools could be a substitute for 
investmg in new energy sources. Since many of the barriers to energy efficiency are 
insti~tional, investing in law schools (or other forms of human capital) may do as much to 
preserve our energy endowment as investing in new energy sources. 
Perhaps Daly is making a normative rather than descriptive cl~m. His point may be 
that we ought not to treat natural and human-produced capital as substitu!-'lble, not that we do 
not. But we may ask why we should accept this restriction on substitution if well-being 
would be improved by violating it, e.g. by using the benefits of petroleum depletion for law 
schools or medical research rather than for energy conservation. The reply may be that while 
violating this restriction may be a good thing to do, it would not be sustainable, and the 
attempt here is to ·give an analysis of sustainability. One response to this reply would be to 
say so much the worse for sustainability. If concern for sustainability does not lead us to do 
what is best (or at least better), then it is hard to see why we should make it decisive in our 
decision-making. 
In addition to these questions about what should be sustained, the idea of sustainability 
also raises questions of sca1e. 12 No one expects humans or other forms of life to last 
forever. Indeed, evolutionary theory implies that they will not. Given that "forever" is not a 
reasonable answer to the question of how long we should try to sustain something, we need 
some way of thinking about the temporal goal of sustainability. Our resource management 
policies would be very different if sustainability were thought of in terms of millennia rather 
than decades. Similar questions arise with respect to geographical scale. ,Should people 
attempt to maintain natural capital in their bioregions, their states, their countries, their 
continents, their planet, or in their solar system? These may sound like silly or "academic" 
questions, but they arise in real debates about (for example) whether a population or species 
can be reduced or eliminated in one area so long as it is increased or preserved in another. 
11Donald Worster effectively presses this point in "The Shaky Ground of Sustainability," in Sachs, W. (ed.), 
Global Ecologv: A New Arena of Political Conflict (London: Zed Books, 1993), pp. 132-145. ' 
7 
Focusing on national or subnational sustainability might lead to very different policies 
regarding trade than focusing on global sustainability. 
How Important is it to Achieve Sustainability? 
. As important as sustainability is to many people now, it is hard to believe that it has 
always been an important goal. Indeed, it-is interesting to imagine what response people in 
diverse cultures at earlier times would have had to the idea of sustainability. While various 
cultures have been more or Jess "biophilic" and attitudes towards nature have been many and 
varied, I doubt that the idea of sustainability would generally have resonated with people 
outside of our immediate cultural context. 13 For most of human history nature has been too 
large and overwhelming for people to worry about sustaining it. Moreover, whatever 
sustaining is to be done has been someone else's job in most cultures. God or providence 
have generally been regarded as the sustainers of both humans and nature. In this century we 
have lost confidence in the idea that the world is self-sustaining or under divine protection. 
At the same time we see that the threat to nature comes primarily from ourselves. Ironically, 
since there are no other applicants for the job, we who are nature's greatest enemy have 
appointed ourselves as its savior. In my opinion, the idea of sustainability is a distinctly 
modem notion, closely tied to the schizophrenia of modern life that simultaneously persecutes 
nature while trying to protect it.14 
The importance of sustainability is not beyond question. Alan Holland has pointed out 
that the value of some goods, ranging from disposable diapers to sunsets, are partly 
constituted by their transitory nature. Any attempt to sustain them would be silly or self-
defeating.1s But perhaps we should go further and embrace the lessons of the new ecology 
"On the idea of ~biophilia," see Wilson, E.O., Biophilia (Cambridge: Harvarcl University Press, 1984}, 
141 develop this theme regarding endangered species in "Zoos Revisited," in Norton, B., M. Hutchins, E. 
Stevens, and T. Mapel (eds.), Ethics on the Ark: Zoos. Anfmal Welfare, and Wildlife Conservation 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, I 995), pp. 52·66. 
15Holland, Alan, "The Use and Abuse of Ecological Concepts in Environmental Ethics," Biodiversity and 
Conservation 4 (1995), p. 814. 
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- that turmoil and change is the way of nature. 16 From this perspective everything is 
disposable or transient, not just diapers and sunsets. Our resistance to this is more 
psychological than logical. Just as humans fear and avoid death, so they resist environmental 
change. Tranquil people and societies, more attuned to the ways of nature, would perhaps be 
accepting of both death and environmental change. 
The concern for sustainability may be a distinctively modern one and it may not be 
appropriate to sustain everything we value. Still, in general, we value sustainability, although 
people disagree about its scope and importance. Over the human population there is a range 
of attitudes about the importance of sustainability. Most people probably believe that some 
things should be sustained at all costs, that others should be gotten rid of as soon as possible, 
and that most things fall somewhere in between. What category things wind up in depends in 
part on people's attitudes towards them. Many people think that the human species should be 
sustained at all costs, as well as human communities and cultures, even ones that are 
economically inefficient or exploitative. On the other hand, most people probably think that 
·J:IIV should be driven to extinction as soon as possible. Various snail darters fall somewhere 
in between, with different'people assigning very different weights to the importance of 
sustaining them.17 
What is important to recognize is that even if it is generally accepted that sustainability 
is a good thing, the question of how good a thing cannot be avoided. Sustainability must 
sometimes be traded off against other goods, including the welfare of our poor 
contemporaries. This is the trade-off that the Brundtland Commission wanted to avoid, but it 
is inescapable. 
16See, for example, Botkin, D., Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the TwentV-First Centurv (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990}. 
17Here I make reference to a small fish, the discovery of which put the brakes on the half-built, multi-billion 
dollar Tellico Dam. There were many reasons not to build the dam, but the fact that it was (temporarily} halted 
by a "trash" fish led to amendment of the Endangered Species Act and sening the stage for future assaults on the 
Act. For discussion, see Wheeler, W. Bruce, and M. J. McDonald, TVA and the Tellico Dam, 1936-1979: A 
Bureaucratic Crisis in Post-Industrial America (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1986). 
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Summarizing this section, we can say that the concept of sustainability is deeply 
contested. People disagree about what it is and how important it should be regarded. 
Disagreements about sustainability reflect not only differenr interests, but also different ideals 
and values. Disagreements concern the range of proper human relationships to nature, the 
way decisions should be made, and whose voices should prevail. However, despite the 
contested nature of sustainability, this idea· may have its uses. 
The Uses of Sustainability 
It is quite common for parties in enviro~ental disputes to seek the normative high 
ground. One way of trying to do this is to define a teclmical term, and then implement the 
hypothetical imperative suggested by it. For example, some environmentalists have attempted 
to define a technical notion of ecosystem health, suggesting that environmental policy should 
follow by implication. I& I am skeptical about such attempts. If successful, they wrongly 
bypass the ethical ~d political disputes that are at the heart of environmental questions. If 
they fail, they provide another, generally more confused forum in which the ethical and 
political conflicts are reproduced. 19 
Despite these reservations, it is important for people who disagree to practice a 
common discourse and, to some extent anyway, have a common conceptual framework. 
Because of the very breadth of the notion of sustainability and its popular appeal, this 
language has the potential to structure discourse between people who have quite different 
values and epistemologies. At this stage anyway, no one owns the sustainability discourse in 
the way in which ecologists own the discourse of ecosystem health. If parties to a dispute can 
agree that sustainability matters, then arguments will turn on the meaning of sustainability and 
how various policies contribute to its realization. There will be room for a great deal of 
disagreement, but the parties will at least be using the same words even if they assign them 
11For such views see some of the essays in Costanza, R., B. Norton, and B. Haskell, Ecosystem Health: New 
Goals for Environmental Management (Washington: Island Press, 1992); and Environmental Values 4 (1995), pp 
283-376, the special theme issue of the journal devoted to ecosystem health. 
19f'or further discussion see my "Ecosystem Health: Some Preventive Medicine," Environmental Values 4 
(1995), pp. 333-344. 
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different meanings. Some progress will have been made if they can agree on the importance 
and centrality of sustainability, even if they disagree about what sustainability is and how it 
~an be realized. This may seem like a small achievement, but often parties to various 
disputes do not even share a common vocabulary, much less a common conceptual 
framework. 
As a negative example, consider the current dispute in America over the death penalty. 
The small band of abolitionists speaks of the death penalty's lack of deterrence, while those in 
favor of the death penalty speak of the need for retribution. They disagree not just about the 
death p_enalty, but also about what considerations are relevant in deciding whether or not to 
support it. Not only are their beliefs distinct, but their vocabularies are disjoint. 
Although the sustainability discourse has some potential usefulness, at the level of 
abstract, philosophical discussion it is unlikely to have much traction. As we have seen, even 
the technical defmitions of sustainability are excessively abstract and in at least some cases 
fail to be sufficiently sensitive to environmental concerns. The language of sustainability is 
likely to be most powerful when used in highly contextualized concrete cases, and when it is 
employed negatively. I will discuss these suggestions in tum. 
People may have no idea what sustainability means in general, yet have definite ideas 
about what it would be like for Boulder, Colorado, Rocky Mountain National Park, or the 
Northern Rockies region to be sustainable. Focusing on specific questions not only provides 
content to various abstract conceptions of sustainability, but also helps make clear the trade-
offs between sustainability and other goods. If, for example, sustainability for Colorado's 
Front Range means that no one can have a lawn because water transfers from other 
watersheds are not allowed, then some people may decide that sustainability isn't such· a hot 
idea after all and that it should take a back seat to other values. While some people may 
think that moving from vague agreement to precise disagreement is a step in the wrong 
direction, I disagree. I believe that some progress will have been made if people understand 
the choices and trade-offs they face and confront them directly, even if they disagree (at least 
initially) about how to respond. 
In many specific contexts the language of sustainability can be made more useful by 
focusing on what is unsustainable rather than on a positive definition of sustainability. Often 
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people who would initially disagree about what sustainability is can agree about ':"hen 
something is unsustainable. Ranchers and environmentalists (for example) may agree that 
eroded, denuded land is unsustainable, even if they disagree about what it would be like for 
the land to be sustainable. People may have different ultimate goals, yet be able to work 
together in preventing practices whlch they agree are clearly unsustainable. Moreover, once 
they have found some common ground about what is unsustainable, they may be able to go 
on to agree about the causes of these unsustainable practices. This, in turn, may bring some 
agreement about what policies should be adopted and what should be avoided. 
If I am correct in thinking that the language of sustainability is most likely to be 
useful when employed negatively in highly contextualized situations, then ironically the 
discourse of sustainability is least likely to be useful at the level for which it was originally 
intended. At the global level there is too little by way of shared beliefs and values to provide 
enough content to ideas of sustainability to make them effective. Since talk abol!t global 
sustainability is far removed from concrete cases and situations, meaningful discourse is 
unlikely to occur. Too many ground level beliefs and presuppositions drop out at the global 
level to make progress, and perhaps even mutual intelligibility, possible. The fonns of 
unsustaioability and the causal linkages involved are too diverse to command much by way of 
common responses. The language of sustainability is more likely to be useful in small 
communities facing specific proble'ms. However, despite my skepticism, there is a desperate 
need for human thought and language to become as integrated as the probl.ems we face. 
While these problems are global, the interests and understandings of humankind are fractured 
and fragmented. One can hope that the sustainability discourse whlch bas become so 
ubiquitous may have some role to play in contributing to this integration. 
Sustainability and the Public Lands 
It is an obvious fact that there is a great deal of conflict about the use and control of 
public lands. Although the sUstainability discourse may have some role to play in managing 
these conflicts, we should not think that it alone can resolve them. Nor should we think that 
conflicts about the public lands are necessarily caused by how these lands are managed. 
There is a great deal of anger, alienation, and insecurity in American society, and thls often 
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fmds expression in issues that have little to do with the sources of these feelings. If it is true 
that the causes of conflict over the public lands are wider than these issues themselves, then 
we should not expect policy chru:tge in this area to end the conflict. Another reason we 
should be modest about the possibility of progress in this area is that the issues are highly 
politicized, and diverse, often conflicting, interests, preferences, and values are at stake. 
While progress can be made on such issues, it requires time, good will, respectful dialogue, 
and a sense of community, all of which are in short supply. The idea of sustainability has its 
uses, but it cannot perform miracles. 
It should come as no surprise that debates about the uses and control of public lands 
are so heated and polarized wlien there is so much disagreement about how to use private 
land. A look around Boulder, or any comparable town in the West, shows that there are quite 
different views about appropriate land-use. Some people use their yards as car parks or 
storage. Others put in gravel or concrete in order to reduce maintenance. Some xeriscape, 
while others grow lawns and flowers that are characteristic of the eastern United States. Still 
others let "nature take its course." People with lawns are often afraid that their yard will be 
contaminated by weeds or unwanted native plants from the neighbor's yard. The xeriscaper 
may hate the smells coming from her neighbor's compost pile. Parking ·a car in a yard is 
illegal in Boulder. Some neighborhoods have restrictive covenants against replacing lawns 
with rocks. When we move to the question of development, conflicts increase. Many people 
would reject the idea that their neighbors have a right to build additional living units on their 
property or to open a commercial establishment. Imagine how people would respond to their 
neighbors turning their land into gravel pits. Zoning restrictions typically separate commercial 
and residential uses, and specify variable densities in different neighborhoods. These 
restrictions are often quite inconsistent, arbitrary, and in many cases involve bad planning; yet 
to a great extent they are often quite representative of people's attitudes. 
In the case of private lands, most people believe that owners' decisions should carry a 
great deal of weight in determining land-use. In the case of public lands, the very idea of 
public ownership is contested. Not only do people have different desires about how these 
lands should be used, but there is little agreement about how conflicts should be resolved. 
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Many people in the West believe that there should be a pyramid of authority in which 
those who live close to the land or use it for extractive purposes should have the loudest voice 
in determining how public lands are used. Indeed, many of these people are opposed to the 
whole idea of public land. They believe that, morally speaking, they own these lands but that 
the federal govenunent has usurped their title to them. Environmentalists and many people 
who live in the rest of the country reject-:_ the pyramid view of whose will should be dominant. 
They believe that everyone owns the public lands, and that they should be managed in ways 
that are maximally consistent with a broad range of interests and desires. When the 
discussion of public lands policy is stuck on whose voices should count in management 
decisions, the question of sustainability barely arises.20 
Another factor that tends to push the discussion of sustainability to the background is 
another view prevalent in many western communities that traditional uses of the public lands 
should take precedence over more recent uses (e.g. recreation). Thus there is a great deal of 
support for the idea that grazing, mining, and other extractive uses should have priority 
because they are the "senior" uses of the land.21 This idea often goes with a romantic view 
of both western history and contemporary realities. Whether justified or not, this view also 
tends to undercut discussions of sustainability by defending traditional uses because they are 
traditional, even if they ultimately lead to what everyone would regard as the degradation of 
the land. 
Reflecting on these conflicts shows how important the sustainability discourse can be 
in setting public lands policy. As I suggested in the previous section, it can structure the 
conversation and supply conunon vocabulary. It can be especially useful when the focus is on 
what is unsustainable in a specific case. But the s'ustainability discourse can also help move 
the conflict away from questions about who should make decisions towards questions about 
20It is difficult to see exactly what the argument is for the pyramid view. It is not generally held that those 
who benefit from government programs should have the loudest voice in detennining how they are run. Indeed, 
when it comes to welfare recipients, the prevailing view se.e"ms to be quite the opposite. 
11It is interesting that these appeals to the importance of place and history typically begin with the settlement 
of these lands by white immigrants; the much more ancient Native-American claims and uses are hardly 
discussed at all outside of a narrow legal context. 
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how we want the land to be used: Even though sustainability is not the all-purpose solvent 
for our environmental problems that many have wanted it to be, it can help to structure and 
clarify the choices and trade-offs that we face. 
Envisioning Sustaioability 
I have argued that the sustainability discourse may have some role to play at the 
present moment in thinking about environmental policy. However there are serious limits on 
what can be accomplished in this discourse. Because of its open-endedness, the language of 
sustainability can draw diverse parties into the conversation. But since we can always ask 
what should be sustained, for what period, in what region - and even why sustainability is 
good, and if it .is good, how good it is - the discourse of sustainability as it is practiced is 
not likely to bring·us to closure with respect to important, long-term issues. Ultimately, the 
concept of sustainability cannot supply the motivation to act. As Beckerman writes, 
... a definition of whether any particular development path is technically 
sustainable does not, by itself, carry any special moral force. The definition of 
a straight line does not imply that there is any particular moral virtue in always 
walking in straight lines.22 
The most important limitation on the sustainability discourse is that, like any other 
concept, it directs our attention towards some concerns and away from others. Sustainability; 
as it is employed in ~ost of its guises, is primarily an economic and anthropocentric notion. 
The moral reorientation that· is required, which involves new relationships between humans as 
well as with other animals and the rest of nature, is unlikely to be affected by developing ever 
more precise understandings of sustainability. We need a discourse that permits deeper 
discussion of aesthetic, spiritual, religious, cultural, and moral values. 
In. his critique of the way the idea of sustainable development has be7n deployed in the 
wake of the Brundtland Commission report, Rajni Kothari has distinguished two notions of 
22Beckerman, supra note 6, Environmental Values 3 (1994). at p. 193. 
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sustainable development.23 One notion is a technical, scientific notion. The other is an 
ethical notion. According to Kothari, the technical, scientific notion of sustainable 
development does not get to the heart of the environmental crisis. For that we need a new 
notion of sustainable development, which he describes in the following way: 
To shift to sustainable development is primarily an 'ethical shift. It is not a 
technological fix, nor a matter of new financial investment. It is a shift in 
values such that nature is valued in itself and for its life support functions, not 
merely for how it can be converted into resources and commodities to feed the 
engine of economic growth. Respect for nature's diversity, and the 
responsibility to conserve that diversity, define sustainable development as an 
ethical ideal. Out of an ethics of respect for nature's diversity flows a respect 
for the diversity of cultures and livelihoods, the basis not only of sustainability, 
but also of justice and equity. The ecological crisis is in large part a matter of 
treating nature's diversity as dispensable, a process that has gone hand in hand 
with the view that a large portion of the human species is dispensable as well. 
To reverse the ecological decline we require an ethical shift that treats all life 
as indispensable.24 
In my view the language of sustainability is not well-suited for carrying the concerns 
that Kothari has articulated. But whether or not one agrees with Kothari's language and 
sentiments, I believe that the present disorder regarding the human relationship to nature will 
not be successfully addressed until we have developed a richer set of positive visions 
regarding the proper human relationship to nature. Articulating these visions is not the job of 
academics alone, but also requires the efforts of writers, artists, and people from all walks of 
life. There is much to be learned from those who Jive close to nature, and the inheritors of 
traditions that have largely been subordinated. But until we come to terms with the "vision 
thing," the best we can hope for is that we shall successfully muddle through. In these times 
21Kothari, Rajni, "Environment, Technology, and Ethics," reprinted in Gruen, L., and D. Jamieson (eds.), 
Reflecting on Nature: Readings in Environmental Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 
228-237. 
1.!!L p. 237. 
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th~ challenge of muddling throug~ is an important one, and should not be taken lightly. But a 
stop along the way should not be mistaken for the end of the joumey.25 
351 thank the staff of the University of Colorado Natural Resources Law Center for their comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper, and the participants in tlhe Western Lands Sustainability Project for lively discussion. 
I have also benefitted from discussions with the University of Colorado Environmental Ethics Reading Posse. I 
especially thank Dr. Richard Wahl for his written comments on an earlier draft. 
17 
